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Herbert Hovenkamp's outstanding new book, Enterprise and
American Law, chronicles what is arguably the most important development in the history of American business law-indeed, one of
the most important developments in the history of American law
generally: the remarkable changes in economic theory and legal

doctrine that attended the rise and fall of the classical business
corporation.
Professor Hovenkamp details the ways in which classical and
neoclassical economic theory broke down the mercantilist system
of state economic regulation that prevailed during the late eighteenth century and opened the American economy to the benefits of
entrepreneurship, capitalism, and free markets. In so doing, Professor Hovenkamp supplies a useful corrective to popular misconceptions about the allegedly nefarious effects of the large business
corporation's ascendance in the later years of the nineteenth century, and of the free market ideology of Lochner1 and related
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cases. For a time, that ideology limited the ability of special political interests to hamper the beneficial development of the large
corporation.
Despite the remarkable achievement of this book, Professor
Hovenkamp fails to fully appreciate the contributions of the classical business corporation. In the face of overwhelming evidence that
classical economic theory and the classical business corporation
have contributed enormously to the nation's economic welfare,
Professor Hovenkamp views the classical corporation as ultimately
a failure, swept away by a new species of heavily regulated enterprise in the New Deal and post-New Deal eras. The deep structure
of this book is Hegelian: The classical business corporation is born
out of the ashes of its failed predecessor, the mercantilist corporation; it grows ever more powerful and successful during the nineteenth century, reaching its apogee in the Gilded Age; but even in
the midst of its success it begins to fracture as a result of internal
contradictions. It fails to cope adequately with the challenges of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, principally labor
combinations, monopolies, and problems of imperfect competition.
It then enters a period of decline in which government intervention is increasingly seen as necessary to control its adverse effects;
and ultimately it expires in the flames of the New Deal, out of
which is born a very different business enterprise, the post-classical business corporation.
This implicit dialectical model lends structure to the book, but
it also risks imposing an order which is not necessarily present in
the historical record. Professor Hovenkamp's evidence could show
equally well that the classical corporation, and the theories of robust markets and freedom of contract that justified it, were lasting
triumphs of economic development-triumphs which, while not
without adverse consequences, nevertheless greatly benefited the
American public.
Moreover, Professor Hovenkamp surely overstates the case
when he proclaims the death of the classical corporation and of
neoclassical economic theory. Certainly economic theory has
changed, but a powerful strain in economic theory today retains
the hallmarks of the classical and neoclassical traditions: confidence in the efficacy of market orderings and suspicion of government intrusion into private economic arrangements. Far from having expired in the New Deal, classical theory has in many respects
undergone a resurgence over the past few decades.
Furthermore, while the classical corporation-in the sense of a
business enterprise operating free of substantial governmental re-
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straints on its activities-is indeed a thing of the past, the essence
of American business enterprise remains competitive and marketdriven. In a few areas-too few, regrettably-the government has
even loosened regulatory constraints. Supporting these experiments in deregulation-the airline, trucking, and securities industries come to mind-is the modern economic theory that sees government interference with market forces as generally adverse to
the welfare of the public and as often serving narrow, organized
political interests.
This review is organized according to the three stages that
Professor Hovenkamp identifies in the life cycle of the classical
business corporation and classical and neoclassical economic theory: rise, decline, and fall. First, however, I comment briefly on
Professor Hovencamp's historical methodology.
I.

METHODOLOGY

If Professor Hovenkamp's historiography can be faulted, it is
in the importance which he attributes to economic theory in the
development of legal doctrine and public policy during the periods
he discusses. Professor Hovenkamp distances himself not only
from public choice theorists, but also from "Marxists, conservatives, and even many liberals" who believe that every economic
question the law addresses is ultimately answered by interest
group politics (pp 5-6). This view, in Professor Hovenkamp's opinion, is "misleading and limited" because "theory has always been
an essential part of state policy" (p 6). As an example, Professor
Hovenkamp cites the problem of natural monopolies, where simple
reference to the political power of the affected interest groups
could not explain their regulation. In such cases, "theory was the
dog and politics but the tail"; the political considerations were
dwarfed by "a simple consideration of accepted theory" (p 6).
Professor Hovenkamp sees the relative power of theory and
politics to determine outcomes as a function of the degree to which
a particular theory is accepted in the culture. Thus, because the
theory of natural monopoly was well-accepted in classical ideology,
natural monopolies were regulated even in an era generally committed to laissez-faire. Conversely, "[w]hen economic theory in an
area is poorly formulated and no clear consensus has emerged
within the community of experts, politics naturally dominates regulatory decision making, for political interests are always present"
(p 107).
With due respect to Professor Hovenkamp, I believe he displays an excessive confidence in the efficacy of theory at generating
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political outcomes. Over the past years, economists and political
scientists of the public choice school have argued persuasively that
government policy toward business is principally driven by the influence of organized interest groups that reward or punish politicians depending on whether they serve the group's interests or not.
Ideology, while not completely unimportant, plays a minor role in
the equation.
II. THE

RISE OF THE CLASSICAL CORPORATION

At the core of Professor Hovenkamp's account is the contrast
between classical economic theory and its predecessor, the mercantilist ideology of the late eighteenth century. Mercantilism, the
dominant ideology at the time of the framing of the Constitution,
had little faith in the market as a means to stimulate economic
growth" (p 11). Instead, mercantilism was based on belief in the
efficacy of, state regulation: domestic industries should be subsidized, imports restricted, and private entrepreneurial activity
channeled and guided by explicit state policy. In short, mercantilism was a form of industrial policy for the eighteenth century.
Consistent with these principles of state intervention in markets, the mercantilist corporation was chartered by special state
permission, and enjoyed substantial subsidies, principally in the
form of protection against competition. The quid pro quo for the
subsidy was that the corporation was to serve a defined state purpose-often the establishment and operation of turnpikes, bridges,
banks, and other essential institutions for economic development
(p 12). To ensure it did not abuse the corporate privilege, the mercantilist corporation enjoyed very limited powers. Generally, it
could exercise only such powers as were explicitly set forth in its
charter or that necessarily flowed from its explicit powers (p 59).
As described by Professor Hovenkamp, mercantilism broke
down and was gradually replaced by classical economic theory during and after the Jacksonian revolution of the 1830s (p 13). The
Jacksonians objected to mercantilism on the ground that it subsidized a few at the expense of many, and that it impaired economic
development by intruding the powers of the state into private market orderings (pp 36-41).
Jackson's attack on the Second Bank of the United States
should be understood in this light (p 37). Seen in Jacksonian
terms, the Bank epitomized the mercantilist corporation: it enjoyed special chartering privileges from the federal government,
and its operations arguably impeded entrepreneurial economic development by deterringthe creation of new, state-chartered insti-
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tutions that could compete in a free marketplace for the provision
of banking services. In substantial respects, this perception of the
Bank may have been misguided, ignoring as it did the Bank's important regulatory and central banking functions. But the basic
Jacksonian objection to the Bank should be understood as part of
a broader reaction against special corporate privileges.
The most important manifestation of the Jacksonian revolution was the liberalization of incorporation laws at the state level,
which eventually resulted in free corporate chartering (pp 37-38,
64). The business corporation lost its status as an engine of state
industrial policy, and instead became a private enterprise for the
pursuit of profit. Following Adam Smith's adage about the invisible hand, the business corporation would serve the public best by
serving the private interests of its owners. Because the corporation
served a private purpose, it enjoyed no special privileges or monopoly status from the state: a corporate charter accorded no special
rights to be free of competition from others. And because free corporate chartering involved no subsidies, the corporation did not
have to be constrained within narrow activity limits. A corporation
could engage in any business, provided that its charter spelled out
permission (pp 59-64).
Professor Hovenkamp ties these developments to broader
movements in the jurisprudential climate of the nineteenth century. He contrasts the two nineteenth century doctrines used to
protect economic liberties-the Contracts Clause and the doctrine
of substantive due process-in terms of the basic distinction between mercantilist and classical economic theory. The Contracts
Clause of the earlier era served mercantilist goals by enforcing the
basic contract between the state and the entrepreneur: it bonded
the state to its promise to accord special rights or privileges to the
entrepreneur, including generous implications of monopoly privileges in corporate charters. The later doctrine of substantive due
process, in contrast, served classical goals by according great respect to private contracts while simultaneously restricting the
state's ability to interfere in markets and refusing to imply monopoly privileges in corporate charters (pp 17-35). The contrast is
nicely drawn and persuasive.
Equally interesting is Professor Hovenkamp's insightful treatment of the development of federalism under classical economic
theory. He illustrates how classical theory, in line with its suspicion about the effects of governmental intervention in markets, developed a concept of federalism that contained a built-in bias
against regulation. It strictly limited the regulatory powers of both
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the state and federal governments, and left many pockets of economic activity essentially unregulated by any legislative entity (pp
79-80). In contrast, as Professor Hovenkamp cogently observes,
"the much broader interpretations of the commerce clause and of
state extra-territorial power that emerged in the twentieth century
have turned the federal system into one that chronically overregulates, because so many markets are subject to simultaneous federal
and state control" (p 80).
To the extent that interstate commercial regulation existed at
all during the classical period, it often took the form of "general"
common law under the doctrine of Swift v Tyson.2 Federal courts
formulated this general common law for situations likely to involve
interests spanning broad geographic areas. Here, again, Professor
Hovenkamp's analysis supplies a much-needed corrective to popular misconceptions. Today, Swift is often seen as a mistaken and
essentially regressive doctrine that unduly intruded the power of
federal courts into matters best left to states for the rule of decision. Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins,3 the case that repudiated
Swift and established that federal courts sitting in diversity of citizenship cases must apply state law, is often portrayed as administering a much-needed quietus to this outlandish regime. In its historical context, however, Swift v Tyson served important and
beneficial purposes of achieving a modicum of reliability, impartiality, and consistency in the law of commercial transactions involving interstate interests. Thus, as Professor Hovenkamp demonstrates, it facilitated the economic integration of the nation into a
single national market (pp 83-89).
Professor Hovenkamp's insights are equally interesting for the
period following the Civil War. He offers an intriguing view of the
Fourteenth Amendment as essentially a charter of economic freedom, including economic freedom for African Americans. Although
the Fourteenth Amendment is a civil rights amendment, the concept of civil rights itself, in historical context, included "a set of
distinctly economic civil rights, namely, the right to make contracts and the right to own property" (p 94, emphasis in original).
The Fourteenth Amendment, as Professor Hovenkamp observes,
"was economic by design" (p 94). Extending the trajectory of these
observations, in historical context, the Supreme Court's later efforts to develop a doctrine of substantive due process to protect
economic liberties against state incursion appeared not to re2 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).

* 304 US 64 (1938).
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present any fundamental distortion of the original purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but rather a fulfillment of an important
element of the original design (pp 94-96).
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the battle between the mercantilist and the classical models of the corporation
ended, with the classical model emerging triumphant. In addressing the doctrines developed during this period, Professor
Hovenkamp debunks the Progressive critique of the jurisprudence
of the times as favoring "big business" over the needs of individuals. Thus, the Supreme Court's determination in Santa Clara4 that
a corporation was a "person" entitled to many of the protections
that the Fourteenth Amendment accords to natural persons was
not, contrary to popular beliefs, a reactionary protection of powerful vested business interests. Rather, the Court, in Professor
Hovenkamp's view, vested corporations with constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as a means for granting
corporate shareholders the same protections of free contract and
substantive due process that were already available to owners of
unincorporated businesses and sole proprietorships. This prevented the Fourteenth Amendment from effectively discriminating
against corporations and in favor of other, potentially less efficient,
forms of business organization (pp 45-47).
III.

THE DECLINE OF THE CLASSICAL CORPORATION

The triumph of the classical corporation and classical economic theory, in Professor Hovenkamp's view, could not last. If
the first half of Professor Hovenkamp's book is an account of the
development and eventual victory of classical economic theory and
of the classical corporation that the theory inspired, the remainder
deals with the difficulties which the classical corporation and classical economic theory encountered in the later nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
Classical economic theory-like its libertarian successors today'-drew its inspiration from faith in the robustness and efficient functioning of private markets. But even as that theory
reached its greatest acceptance in the Supreme Court and elsewhere, it came under challenge from a nascent Progressive ideology
that viewed markets with much greater skepticism. The panic of
4 Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 US 394 (1886).

1 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain (Harvard, 1985); Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution (Chicago, 1980).
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1893 and the economic dislocation that ensued eroded faith in
markets: if unregulated markets could suffer this kind of catastrophe, then perhaps classical theory needed significant revision. Government regulation and control in fragile markets appeared much
more appealing in light of the business failures, unemployment,
and labor strife of the 1890s (p 106).
Against this backdrop of renewed suspicion of free markets,
Professor Hovenkamp discusses classicism's approach to three major issues of industrial policy: the problems of market failure, labor
unions, and monopolization. Addressing these issues, Professor
Hovenkamp takes a number of original and provocative positions.
His treatment of the Slaughter-House Cases,6 for example,
challenges the prevailing orthodoxy, which views the government
action at issue in the case (creating a slaughterhouse monopoly for
the City of New Orleans during Reconstruction) as the product of
venal and corrupt special interest politics (pp 116-17). Professor
Hovenkamp, on the other hand, perhaps engaging in some rhetorical overkill, sees the New Orleans slaughterhouse monopoly as a
"work of great genius" (p 117). He argues that the monopoly was a
creative legislative response to the problem of excessive pollution
of the Mississippi River by unregulated slaughterhouses: the legislature established a central slaughterhouse facility, which all
butchers in the town were permitted to use, and regulated it as to
price like a public utility (pp 118-21).
Equally interesting is Professor Hovenkamp's treatment of the
development'of state policy toward railroads as the classic example
of industry regulation in the late nineteenth century (pp 131-48).
Consistent with his general thesis that economic theory matters in
the creation and implementation of state policy, Professor
Hovenkamp criticizes both the public-interest and capture theories
of railroad rate regulation (pp 132-37). Professor Hovenkamp
claims that the failure of policymakers to understand the economics of the railroad industry resulted in inadequate or inappropriate
regulation of the industry, yielding prices which were either monopolistic or inadequate to cover costs: the railroads "seemed destined to be either filthy rich or perpetually broke" (p 148). With
the development of an adequate understanding of railroad, economics, according to Professor Hovenkamp, the regulatory system

6 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
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was gradually able to develop a more effective strategy of railroad
rate regulation (p 164-68).7
Professor Hovenkamp faults classical economic theory for its
treatment of labor combinations, criticizing as "one of the most
embarrassing political failures of classical economics" (p 5) the notion that combinations of capital and labor should be treated the
same way. This statement is somewhat mysterious, since Professor
Hovenkamp does not offer much evidence about other embarrassing failures. Moreover, his analysis of classical political economy
belies the claim that the treatment of labor combinations represents a dramatic failure of classical political economy. Professor
Hovenkamp does not dispute the essential validity of the classical
analysis, which viewed labor combinations as intended, like business combinations, to raise prices (here, wages) above marketclearing levels. Rather, his objection to the application of the antitrust laws to labor combinations is based on the much narrower
ground that the antitrust laws could not apply equally to labor and
capital. Labor, especially unskilled labor, is a market characterized
by easy entry, making labor combinations in restraint of trade difficult to enforce without coercion because any increase of wages
above market-clearing levels will attract new entry-scabs, in the
case of strikes (p 227). Corporations, on the other hand, could
avoid the reach of the antitrust laws in the late nineteenth century
by merging, rather than by engaging in price-fixing cartels, a strategy not available to labor combinations (p 234).
But these claims do not establish classical policy toward labor
combinations as a failure in any terms other than political. While
it is true that barriers to entry made combinations of capital somewhat easier to enforce than labor combinations, Professor
Hovenkamp's own evidence on the railroad industry demonstrates
that even in capital-intensive industries cartels were difficult to enforce. Railroad cartels repeatedly broke down as a result of rebating and other price cutting measures by member firms (pp 146-47);
conversely, barriers to entry in labor were not always as low as
Professor Hovenkamp suggests: skilled labor could not easily be replaced by scabs. As Professor Hovenkamp himself acknowledges,
labor actually enjoyed a favorable bargaining position vis-a-vis

' Professor Hovenkamp points to the nice irony that railroads, although they may have
earned monopoly profits, on the whole may have reduced the extent of monopolistic practices in the United States because they broke down many other local monopolies by opening
up broader geographic markets (p 141).
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capital during much of the nineteenth century due to the relative
scarcity of workers in the rapidly developing country (pp 213-14).
Further, the fact that corporations could avoid the reach of
the antitrust laws by merging is not a fatal objection to the application of classical theory to labor combinations. Rather, it is an
objection to the limited reach of the Sherman Act, which failed to
deal adequately with the issue of monopoly. The problem was with
the antitrust laws, not with the application of classical (or, by the
late nineteenth century, neoclassical) economic theory, which was
aware of the dangers to competition when a single firm controls
production.

IV. THE FALL
Professor Hovenkamp closes with a picture of the classical
business corporation and classical economic theory in its death
throes (p 349). He associates these events with parallel intellectual
developments in economics and law: the publication of Joan
Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Competition, Edward
Chamberlin's Theory of Monopolistic Competition and of Adolphe
Berle, Jr., and Gardiner Means's The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (p 349). The former studies represent, according
to Professor Hovenkamp, the culmination of a "great upheaval" in
competition theory (p 356). The artificial premises of perfect competition or pure monopoly were replaced by a general economic
theory of competition in imperfect markets, in which scale economies, barriers to entry, and product differentiation made perfect
competition impossible even in markets characterized by multiple
producers. The Great Depression, which appeared to refute in
practice many of the premises of classical and neoclassical economic theory, administered the coup de grace: "[t]he time seemed
ready for a much more regulatory theory of political economy and
of state policy toward business" (p 356).
Similarly, the Berle-Means focus on the separation of ownership and control in the large business corporation destroyed the
premises of classical enterprise law, by demonstrating that firms
cannot be trusted to act in the best interest of their shareholders,
or in the public interest." Thus, according to Berle and Means, the
corporation should be organized to serve the interests of the public
at large 9-a view entirely antithetical to the classical theory of the

8 The Modern Corporationand Private Property 119-25 (MacMillan, 1933).
' Id at vii-viii, 352-57.
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corporation, which viewed it as existing for the sole purpose of
serving the interest of its owners (pp 357-58).
Professor Hovenkamp leaves his readers with an image of the
classical corporation and of classical economic theory in shambles.
By the end of the New Deal, he says, "little was left of the classical
corporation" (p 362). Regulated today by the federal securities
acts, the labor laws, and the antitrust laws (Professor Hovenkamp
could have added the workplace safety laws, the civil rights laws,
the environmental laws, and a host of other regulations), the postclassical corporation is dramatically different from its classical and
neoclassical predecessors. The invisible hand of the market, says
Professor Hovenkamp, "had been struck aside by the very visible
hand of the state" (p 362).
While this picture of the classical business corporation in extremis has an appealing rhetorical ring and effects closure of a satisfying narrative, it is surely grossly overstated. Just as classical
economic theory did not die, but merely evolved into a more sophisticated form in neoclassical theory, neoclassical theory itself
did not expire with the New Deal. Indeed, after a few decades of
decline it has re-emerged over the past decades in the work of
economists such as George Stigler, Milton Friedman, Gary Becker,
Sam Peltzman, and Ronald Coase. Like their classical and neoclassical predecessors, these economists are united in appreciating the
efficacy of markets at achieving beneficial private orderings, and in
viewing government attempts to regulate markets skeptically in
the absence of significant externalities.
We have not seen a revival of the classical business corporation, but noteworthy efforts have been made to deregulate some
industries efforts which draw heavily on the teachings of these
newer economists in the classical mold. Moreover, Professor
Hovenkamp overstates the contrast between the classical corporation and the post-New Deal business enterprise. Although heavily
regulated in some respects, corporations today still pursue private
purposes and still respond to the free play of competitive forces.
The American public is the beneficiary.
This observation aside, the Hovenkamp book stands as a superlative achievement by an outstanding scholar. It is destined to
be a classic, and should be consulted in the future by anyone seriously interested in the history of American business enterprise.

